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The BAROMETER is a student weekly newspaper for the exchange of ideas 
and information concerning the development and improvement of the 
professional environment at the Naval Postgraduate School. Items of 
interest, papers, and articles of interest to the students, staff, and 
faculty as a whole are solicited. 
%*%*%*%*%*%* 
"A general in all his projects should not think so much 
about what he wishes to do as what his enemy will do; that 
he should never underestimate this enemy, but he should put 
himself in his place to appreciate difficulties and hindrances 
the enemy could interpose; that his plans will be deranged 
at the slightest event if he has not forseen everything and 
if he has not devised means with which to surmount the 
obstacles. FREDERICK THE GREAT: 1747 
EDITORIAL: The BAROMETER this week features an interesting article on the vital necessity 
of computers in modern warfare. We are indebted to Professor Baycuro of the EE Department 
for this article and the comments in paraenthesis are his. 
FEATURE: THE REAL REVOLUTION IN WARFARE: THE COMPUTER IMPACT by Stefan T. Possony 
Dr. Possony is at Stanford University's Hoover Institute for War, Peace and Revolution 
and is a specialist in Russian affairs. He appears on national TV and radio when the 
networks need more than casual, untutored comments on changes that occur in Russian 
strategy, politics and leadership. His present article discusses the need for computers 
in modern warfare. Without computers, weapon systems could not be built, tested and 
maintained combat ready and operational. In addition to weapons, computers are required 
for strategic missions: early warning of missile attack, command, control and communicati-
ons (C-3), anti-ballistic missile defense, anti-sub warfare, space operations and 
intelligence. His argument is that one of the main purposes of the Russian detente policy 
is to obtain high-speed computing equipment to support their weapons systems. The data 
shows the USSR imported $300 million dollars worth of computers in 1968 and larger imports 
are scheduled for 1969, 1970. To maintain parity with US computer strength in the 
military, the USSR must import 10 to 20 BILLION dollars worth of gear. The demand is 
for the fastest speed processors that IBM and others make. (From other sources, IBM and 
Control Data have opened offices in Moscow; State Department and DOD must concur on 
shipping the latest gear, but trans-shipment through a neutral country might be made.) 
The article indicates if the US does not sell these high speed machines, their ability to 
hit anti-missile systems would be impaired. He relates accuracy of hitting to computer 
arithmetic operations: 0.5 mile accuracy requires 100,000 operations per second, 0.4 
miles-l to 10 million per second, 0.3 miles well above 10 million per second. The 
_evidence from 1972 data is the USSR is at the 0.5 mile category. Possony cites Defense 
Secretary Schlesinger's statement that the Soviets could impact at 1800 feet (0.3 miles) 
of a target by 1980. Possony argues that this requires military spending for better 
missile defense. The USSR problem is the inability to manage the computer industry 
properly to produce the required computers. (Some programs are solved by the USSR on 
Ford computers at Dearborn, Michigan via cable. Ford sells time for this purpose.) 
ORBIS, The Quarterly Journal of World Affairs, VOL XVII, Fall 73 
EDITORIAL COMMENT: Professor Brock, ME Department, and Miss Lyke of our Library staff were 
kind enough to call the BAROMETERS attention to a two part article on Supertankers from 
the New York Magazine. For anyone who has ever been aboard one of these giants or seen 
them on the open sea this article will be particularly interesting. For those less 
fortunate it is an excellent primer on the ships of the future and what we may be 
letting ourselves in for. The author, Mr. Noel Mostert, begins by relating some historical 
factors concerning the superships. 
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FEATURE: SUPERTANKERS 
"Supertankers are the biggest self-propelled vehicles ever built by man, and also the 
most dengerous. A fully laden 200,000-ton oil tanker has aboard as much potential thermal 
energy as a two-megaton hydrogen bomb, and to most people the ships seem dangerous because 
of their inflammable cargo. But an experienced sailor feels quite safe when he is on a 
tanker brimming with oil. If its cargo tanks aren't breached and remain securely sealed, 
flam~a could actually sweep a laden tanker and gut its living and work areas without touch-
ing off the cargo. A notable instance was the spectacular collision between the 77,648-ton 
Pacific Glory and IOO,I08-ton Allegro off the Isle of Wight in October, 1970; the Pacific 
Glory was torn by engine-room explosions and ravaged by a fire that destroyer her super-
structure and spred across the surrounding sea, yet she kept nearly all of her cargo of 
crude oil intact, and it eventually reached its destination in Europe. 
What explodes is not the oil but the vapor given off by it. This is hydrocarbon 
vapor, which has a very low flash point; it will burn or explode at temperatures as low 
as forty degrees below zero. It lies in dense possession of the tanks after the oil cargo 
has been discharged, and tankers are most dangerous to their crews when they are empty, 
travelling ballasted. 
Whatever system is used, it is clear that an explosion needs a source of ignition, 
and the art of tanker safety, therefore, lies not only in maintaining an atmospheric 
balance at a safe level in the tanks but also in avoiding any chance of a spark's reaching 
the tanks if the level should become unsafe. It seems on the face of it implausible that 
a spark so faint as to be all but invisible could blow up a 200,000-ton ship, but I have 
heard tankermen say that they have nightmares about a worn wire rubbing against another, 
or the switch of an ordinary flashlight, or even the static of a nylon shirt. No smoking 
is ever allowed on deck, of course. On a least one line I know, decks are chipped only 
when a ship is loaded, and even then only when all sand grit have been washed off them 
and there is a wind of at least five miles an hour. 
Despite all precautions, oil tankers have been blowing up since the earliest days of 
their existence. On December 12, 1969, the 206,000 ton Shell tanker Marpessa, travelling 
in ballast, sank off Senegal on her maiden voyage, after a tank explosion that killed two 
men. She was the biggest ship that had ever foundered. On December 29th, a sister ship, 
the Mactra, 206,885 tons, also owned by Shell, suffered an equally violent tank explosion 
in the Mozambique Channel, again killing two men. And the same day, off the west coast 
of Africa, the 219,000-tone Norwegian tanker Kong Haakon VII was torn open by a tank 
explosion. 
The author suggests maybe our pace was a bit too rapid. 
The possibility that these huge ships had been pushed too far too fast, technologically 
speaking, had already been ominously suggested by the fact that many of them had experienced 
serious buckling before or after launching, or on sea trials. Now a suspicion began to 
grow that an entirely new and incalculable set of fire-and-explosion hazards made them 
fatally flawed as a type. Probably far more cash and time were subsequently spent on 
unravelling the mystery of the explosions than had been spent on models, experiments, and 
general research before the prototype supertankers were built. It was the first serious 
attempt ever made to understand the nature and character of these ships. 
Following many looks at the flaws the author goes on to describe one remedy. 
As a result of these studies, Gulf now uses the inert-gas system while tank cleaning 
on all of its ships. There have been no explosions on ships equipped with this system. 
Ninety per cent of all new supertankers are being equipped with it, and insurers are 
offering reduced rates on the vessels that have it. 
At this point the author relates his personal experiences aboard a giant tanker on a 
regularly scheduled run. Although too extensive to reprint here for the seafaring among 
the readers this section will be of particular interest. 
What about the down time of the super ship engineering plants - the article points t~ 
an economic clue. The high incidence of tanker breakdown off the South African 'coast since 
the closing of the Suez Canal has made it worthwhile for salvage tugs to station themselves 
permanently in those waters, with .their radios tuned to the passing traffic. 
The author1 now shifts the emphasis of the story to another main theme - ecological 
damage. 
Apart from the immediate damage done to the sea's furface at the time of accident, 
sunken ships, if they take a lot of oil down with them (and the Wafra still has more than 
thirty thousand tons inside her), do far more in the long run by slowly leaking from the 
seabed as they break up from the action of currents and sea movement or disintegrate with 
time. The German cruiser Blucher, sunk in the Oslo Fjord in April, 1940, for example, 
began leaking oil from her huge bunkers only in June 1969. After the Wafra had been 
hauled off a reef, she was sunk by South African bombers in deep water off the coast; as 
her tanks gradually collapse, slicks will be fed steadily into the Agulhas Current, flowing 
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directly above her. The Texanita, which also lies under the Agulhas Current, was empty 
when she went down, but she had several thousand tons of bunker fuel aboard. Slicks have 
been consistently forming on the surface above her. 
The problems are now beginning to draw international interest, as Mr. Mostert points 
out. 
A United Nations estimate published in 1970 said that one and a half million metric 
tons of oil were going into the sea every year as a result of bilge and ballast operations, 
and that two hundred thousand tons of it came from general shipping, the rest from tankers. 
With more than two thousand ships rounding the Cape every month, it cannot be idle 
speculation that Good Hope's waters see a very handsome share of this. 
The international regulations framed and approved by the Intergovernmental Martime 
Consultative Organization (IMCO) make it a punishable offense to discharge oil in any area 
within fifty miles of land, or within a hundred miles of special areas particularly 
vulnerable to pollution. 
The authors conclusions are read as a plea and a warning to seaman and to those who 
~ever sail. 
The world's seas are going to suffer vastly more damage if the majority of oil ships 
continue to be built and operated and sailed by standards of the sort that now prevail. 
If supertankers have been built with design faults that could have been foreseen, it may 
be because the rapid amortization of these ships appears to make them more expendable 
than any other merchant vessels in history. 
The oil is runaing out; as a resource, it is finite, and always was. The seas were 
infinite, and should have remained so. We may find an alternative to oil for lighting our 
lamps and turning our wheels. The seas we shall not replace. Over the past two decades, 
we have undone much of the structural work of the aeons; the present decade may destroy a 
great deal more-perhaps more than we can possibly suspect at present. Why should we 
allow this unspeakable depredation, when so much of it is necessary only to the dedicated 
greed of a few men and corporations? There is no reason. For those on shore, shipwreck 
was once a not unwelcome event; it drew plunderers from far and near. It was talked 
about for generations, with wistful recollection of the drama and the spoils. But ship-
wreck, once feared principally by those on board, has become in our own time a dread more 
solemn for those on shore. Helicopters get the sailors off; we clean up the muck. For 
the first time, we one land have more to lose, and nothing to gain. That is why the 
responsibility for ships is no longer the sailor's alone, and has become ours." 
